Missions and Anthropology:
A Love/Hate Relationship

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This insightful article traces the history of anthropology through its earlier stages, and describes the ambivalent attitudes many missionaries developed toward this brash, emerging discipline. It then turns to the current scene and shows how the fundamental revolution in western thought — which Professor Hiebert describes as a paradigm shift in epistemology — drastically affected the social sciences. Christians in general, and missiologists in particular, should welcome this shift, despite the tensions it generates, for we are thereby brought "closer to the biblical perspective of the limits of human knowledge and of the importance of faith."

If astronomy with its heliocentric theory, biology with its concept of evolution and psychology with its notion of the subconscious have raised increasingly difficult theological questions in the past, today the most penetrating questions are being raised by the social sciences. And these promise to be even more disturbing than those that came before. This is particularly true of the questions now being raised in anthropology.

The church can no longer avoid anthropological questions by closing its eyes to them. Not only do anthropological assumptions now pervade much of modern western thought, but also Christian missions, because of their international character, are raising many of the same questions. Missions and anthropology are closely related and the interaction between them has been characterized by the ambivalence — the love and hate — that accompanies intimate relationships.

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The Early Years: Humans — Gods or Beasts?

As Reining has shown (1970:3-11), anthropology in England had its origins in the active mission and humanitarian movements of the early nineteenth century that arose, in part, out of the Wesleyan revivals. One of these, the Society for the Abolition of Slavery, arose in defense of the slaves. After bringing an end to slavery in England (1807 to 1833), the abolitionists turned their attention to the welfare of native peoples in the colonial dependencies, and organized the Aborigines Protection Society in London in 1838.

Soon after its establishment, the society split over the question of how best to help the “natives”. One faction, associated with the missionaries, wanted to protect the rights of the aborigines by giving them immediately the “privileges of western civilization.” The other wanted to study the people in order to better understand them and the ways of helping them. The latter group left the society and organized the Ethnological Society of London in 1843.

One of the critical questions of the times was what does it mean to be human. Both missionaries and anthropologists had come face to face with a bewildering variety of peoples from different races and cultures, and both had to decide whether or not they considered these people to be fully human in the same sense that the educated peoples of the west were thought to be human.

The missionaries were committed to the unity of humankind by their theology. Convinced as they were of the truthfulness of their Christian message and its universality, they went to all parts of the world and to every level of society to minister for they considered all as created in the image of God and having an eternal destiny. But, as anthropologists were all too ready to point out, in subtle ways they often depersonalized the people to whom they went.

Some of this depersonalization took place because missionaries were people of their times. Like their contemporaries, they were convinced of the superiority of their culture, and they did not always differentiate this from their faith in the superiority of Christianity. They came from a society that was dazzled by the success of science and technology, and that saw itself as the end point of an ascending cultural and religious evolution. It is not surprising, therefore, that
missionaries gave little credence to indigenous sciences, social organizations and religious beliefs. For the most part they were not free of the cultural ethnocentrisms of their civilization.

Depersonalization also occurred because western theology dichotomized people into supernatural and natural beings. Some saw people as spiritual objects to be converted, others as creatures needing social and material aid. Neither viewed humans from a holistic perspective. To be fair, it must be recognized that on the ground level most missionaries were deeply involved with programs of evangelism, relief, education, hospitals, social uplift and development. For example, faced with famine, most did all they could to care for the needy. But a theological dichotomy often led to fragmented programs that ministered to one or another human need, and not to integrated programs that served whole people. Theologically the problem was how to deal with people's humanness and its relationship to their divine calling.

Finally, anthropologists charged the missionaries with being the tools of colonialism. At times missionaries were funded by colonial monies,¹ and they were not above using their relationships with colonial rulers to bring about changes in native cultures. Even more significant was the fact that they shared the basic assumptions that underlay colonial thought—assumptions that led to the segregation of western people mentally and socially from the people they came to serve. North Europeans and Americans did not migrate to the new land and intermarry with its people. Their "homes" remained in the West.

Anthropologists, for their part, accepted the people in their own cultural contexts and sought to understand them by studying them. At first this was done at arm's length, but in time living with the people and participating in their cultures became the hallmark of anthropological fieldwork. But, the missionaries were quick to point out, they too were guilty of dehumanizing the people.

Anthropological dehumanization occurred on the theoretical level. With the general acceptance of an evolutionary approach to human origins, the question arose: when in the evolutionary sequence did creatures become human? What sets humans apart from animals? Its corollary was: are all living races of mankind fully human? Debates were held on whether the newly discovered Pygmies of central Africa were humans or apes, and
whether tribal peoples had a "primitive mind" that, in some sense, was prelogical and irrational. In 1863 the Ethnological Society split over the question whether or not Negroes were a different, and presumably lesser, species than Europeans. The big majority held not only that the Blacks were physically of a different species, but that this made them mentally and morally incapable of assimilating civilized ways. This faction left and organized the Anthropological Society of London. The two factions finally reunited in 1871 and formed the Anthropological Institute of Great Britain and Ireland. By then many of the anthropologists had come to affirm the essential racial and psychological unity of humankind.

On another level a naturalistic approach questioned the meaning of culture. If this, like man, could be reduced to biological determinants, how were humans distinct from other creatures, and what meaning was to be found in their existence. Carried to the extreme, this position rendered all human thought systems meaningless.²

Anthropologists also dehumanized people by their attempts to be value-free. Given their growing Rousseauian commitment to nonintervention in the lives of primitives, there was little to justify their existence as applied anthropologists. Consequently they turned to academia for legitimacy. They adopted the scientific methodology that had worked so well in the physical sciences, and sought to give objective, unbiased analyses of non-western peoples. However, "objective" in this context meant detached and value-free. And their detachment dehumanized people by treating them as predetermined objects rather than as rational human beings,³ while their avoidance of values denied help to those in need and those oppressed by the advance of western civilization. Referring to the Queensland aborigine hunts in which Europeans slaughtered the primitive tribesmen of Australia for their land, one anthropologist noted:

> Anthropological science, like all sciences, is passionless on the point, but a better knowledge of its deductions and principles would have instilled some feelings of prudence and pity into the murderers, who seem to revel in the unnatural process of extinction (Popular Magazine of Anthropology 1866:6).

Still, anthropologists did nothing; for anthropology had no basis on which to build a morality.

Scientific methodology, as it came to be used in anthropology, dehumanized people in yet another way. Given a growing
atheistic and deterministic stance, it is not surprising that early anthropologists gave little respect to the people's explanations of their own activities. They treated religions as irrational superstitions, and gave scientific explanations for human beliefs and activities in terms of economic and environmental factors on the one hand, or of sociopolitical factors on the other. Anthropologists were no less philosophically ethnocentric in their relationship to other world views than were most Christian missionaries.

Finally, as the Marxist anthropologists in England point out, anthropologists became increasingly involved in the colonial processes. The early ones did so by providing an academic rationalization of colonial role and the "white man's burden", the later ones by providing the field information necessary to implement the move to indirect colonial rule made necessary by budget cutbacks. A great deal of the research carried out between 1930 and 1950 by many of the leading anthropologists was funded by the British colonial office. Furthermore, like their missionary contemporaries, anthropologists shared the basic colonial assumptions. Despite their intimate association with people during their fieldwork, they remained ultimately segregated from them. Anthropologists returned to the safety of their academic environments where they could talk about "their people." In the long run they shared even less identification with the "natives" than the missionaries.

The Middle Decades: Unity and Variety

The second basic question to face both anthropology and missions was that of unity versus variety. By the 1930s both had come to accept the basic unity of humankind, but both were faced with an apparently unending and arbitrary variety in human behavior and cultural forms. In what way, then, were people one? And how does this variety relate to an underlying unity?

The question manifests itself in several forms. For missionaries the primary problem was: how should Christianity relate to the variety of non-Christian religions? Some took the position of radical displacement: truth was found only in Christianity; therefore all other religions were categorically rejected and would have to be replaced in toto. On the other extreme, some saw all religions as man's search for God, and
Christianity only as the closest approximation of the truth. In between lay a multitude of positions stressing in varying degrees the uniqueness of Christianity and the presence of truth in other religions.

Closely related to this were several other problems. For instance, how does the Gospel express itself in the context of cultural variety? Western thought stressed cultural uniformity and western culture as the ideal. The Gospel became equated with a particular cultural form. But missions faced the fact that the Gospel can and does take many different cultural forms, and that the Church, to be effective, must be indigenous. Then what of the Gospel and of the Church is unchanging and eternal, and what is cultural and temporal? How should the missionary deal with such phenomena as people movements, polygyny and homogenous cultural groups?

Or how does the unity of the Church manifest itself in the midst of denominational differences? Is the Church the divine body of Christ, or is it a sociocultural organization subject to analysis by the social sciences? To emphasize only one or the other is to overlook the fact that the Church, indeed, is both.

To the anthropologist, the question of unity versus variety came in another form. Early anthropologists sought to reduce the variety of cultural traits to a single whole by incorporating them all into a single broad theory of cultural evolution. However, intensive fieldwork made it clear that these traits made little sense by themselves. They had to be understood within the context of a larger sociocultural system. But there seemed to be no limit to the ways in which these systems organized the universe and no way to integrate the variety into a single comprehensive theory of culture.

To be sure, there was some search for cultural universals using the methods of cross-cultural comparison — a search for institutional universals such as the family, for religious universals such as the belief in a high god, or at least, for a common historical origin. But none of these stood the test. Each new fieldworker found exceptions to any generalizations, and discovered still other ways of ordering the world or yet more fundamental differences between them. The vision of unity faded in the light of cultural variety.

In the face of this variety, and lacking any unifying empirical universals, or metaphysical and ethical absolutes, anthropology
turned to relativism. Variety was not only thought to exist at the most basic levels of human thought and behavior, but also at times extolled. Even comparison was called into question. It soon became apparent, however, that pure relativism undermined anthropology’s claims to be a universal science of man, and, in the end, to a denial of the validity of science itself.

**The Current Revolution**

In the period following World War II considerable thought was given both in missions and in anthropology to the two questions posed earlier. But even as some resolution was being reached on them, another, and more fundamental revolution in western thought began to take place: a paradigm shift in epistemology that is challenging the conceptual frameworks of both.

**Humanness**

Ideologically, missions and anthropology, with little exception, have come to accept the unity of humankind even though vestiges of racism survive in practice. Nevertheless, the question of what it means to be human is still central to both.

Missions has begun to recognize the human dimensions of people — the fact that they are psychological and sociocultural beings. Anthropology, linguistics and psychological counseling are becoming standard parts of mission training programs, and sociocultural principles and research part of mission planning. But this often amounts to a superficial borrowing of a few select concepts that do not disturb the existing theological framework.

Missions has yet to develop a theology of culture that comes to grips with the issues raised by the social sciences. Some thought has been given to a theology of language (e.g. Ebeling 1973) and of social organization. More recently attention has turned to theologies of economics, politics and power. But these need to be integrated with theologies of ecology, aesthetics and religion to form a broader theology of culture. The question is, quite simply, how does scientific knowledge integrate with theological knowledge. The two cannot be kept apart, for whether we like it or not, the use of the products of science bring with them the assumptions on which science is based. The danger is that these assumptions and their products will be absorbed into theology unwittingly and without critical analysis.
The theological answer to the question of humanness seems to lie in an understanding of the doctrine of the incarnation. The incarnation takes into account both the divine and the natural dimensions without reducing one to the other, and without segregating them. Rather the two are related without the loss of either. The incarnation is most fully expressed in Jesus Christ, but it becomes a fitting analogy for our understanding of human beings and the Church.

The problem of humanness that anthropologists face is a different one. With no place in their models for the divine nature of people, they are left with little sense of the dignity and destiny of human beings. Nor do they have a foundation for determining values and ethics, without which people are reduced to beasts. Having noted the similarities of humans to the lower animals, they are hard pressed to define precisely what sets humans apart — and they are convinced that in some ways humans are unique.

A second problem is inherent in the methodology of the natural sciences that was borrowed by the social sciences. This makes a sharp distinction between the observer and the observed, and treats the latter as an object that is part of a closed, deterministic system. The observer, on the other hand, is assumed to be rational and undetermined. He is therefore in a position to give an objective and unbiased analysis of the situation.

While this approach has given us many insights into the sociocultural order, it was unable to answer most of the more complex questions facing the social sciences because it failed to take into account the fact that we are dealing with humans. The growing rejection of the concept of a "prelogical mentality" sprang from the realization that when the observer passed judgment on the humanness of others, he was passing judgment on himself.

The methodological and theoretical implications of recognizing the objects of our analysis to be human are profound. Essentially it means replacing the objective basis of knowledge with a hermeneutical one. Trying to understand people as humans always involves the process of interpretation.

Several implications are becoming clear:

1. Anthropologists have begun to take the cognitive dimensions of human beings seriously. Behavioral studies alone
are not adequate in explaining human beings. Much remains to be done on developing methods that show us what is going on in other peoples’ minds, but the fact that we must take their cognitive systems seriously is now widely accepted in anthropology. Many, in fact, now define key concepts such as “culture” in purely mentalistic terms.

Together with the recognition of cognitive systems has come an acceptance of the importance of religious beliefs and values. These are no longer considered meaningless superstitions, but charters validating their respective cultures and paradigms that help people resolve the paradoxical questions of life.

2. Anthropologists are seeking to find out what these cognitive systems are. The result is the field of emic studies. Not only must the analyst know his own cognitive structures but also those of the people he is studying, for it is from their own perspective that people respond.

3. Hermeneutical knowledge must be reflexive. Methodologists are becoming aware of the fact that the participant observer affects the culture in which he works. People are aware of him and change their behavior to accommodate his presence.

4. It must also be self-reflexive. As Devereux points out (1967), major changes take place in the observer himself during the field experience. While most anthropologists would not go so far as Devereux and hold that these changes in the observer constitute the “real data” for anthropology, they do emphasize the need for the observer to monitor these internal shifts.

5. Scientific explanation must take seriously peoples’ explanations of their own behavior. Moreover, such explanations are “preferable to causal accounts in all cases — except where the behavior is irrational in the sense of ‘incongruent with accepted beliefs’ or where behavior is in accordance with beliefs that are themselves irrational” (Wiebe 1976:38). If this criterion is accepted, science consists not only of events to be causally explained, but also of proposals to be rationally evaluated.

6. As Habermas points out (1971), one of the critical methodological questions becomes that of interpretation. It is impossible to gain a purely “objective” analysis of other human beings, for their conceptual world (and this includes not only cognitive categories and assumptions, but also memories,
feelings and motivations) must be translated into that of the observer. And in the process of interpretation much is lost or distorted.

7. The question of ultimate truth arises. Earlier anthropology had wrestled with the concept of cultural relativism. Now it faces philosophical relativism. To take other thought systems seriously is to raise the question of their truthfulness vis-à-vis science. Anthropology is being forced to confront the problem missions faced earlier, namely, what is truth, and how does one thought system that claims to be true relate to other thought systems.  

8. Hermeneutical knowledge must be historical and developmental in perspective. Unlike natural laws that, generally speaking, belong to steady state theories, principles associated with life and, particularly, humans must take into account developmental changes taking place in the agents of observation. Cumulatively this leads to fundamental changes taking place in societies and cultures that cannot be explained fully in terms of scientific principles.

9. Finally, a human science calls for involvement in the society and lives of people. One cannot sit dispassionately by when relating to people in need. In anthropology the growing awareness of this had led to an interest in applied anthropology. To be sure, some of this interest rises out of a struggle to survive as a discipline. The declining job market for anthropologists in academia is raising the question, anthropology for what. The current projections are that by 1985 two out of every three graduating anthropologists will have to find employment outside of teaching — presumably in some field of applied anthropology. Consequently there is a growing effort to justify anthropology to the American society, and to broaden the scope of anthropological participation in the job market.

But interest in applied anthropology runs deeper than this. Today a wide range of activist anthropologists (Christian, Marxist and other) are raising the question whether anthropologists can remain uninvolved in helping others when they have the knowledge and power to do so. Doesn’t noninvolvement depersonalize people, and preserve oppression and colonialism? This concern is leading to the formation of agencies for applied anthropology and human development, and to publicizing efforts by anthropologists who not only study
but also help the people among whom they work. In spite of this increased interest in values and ethics, and in the dignity of the person, anthropology has not come to grips with the divine nature of human beings, and, therefore, has no clear answer as to what it means to be fully human.

Unity and Variety

There has been a growing consensus between missions and anthropology on the issues of unity and variety. Missions has come to accept cultural variety. Candidates are taught to face culture shock, and to be culturally sensitive to the people among whom they work. Bible translators have become aware of the fundamental differences between languages and have contributed significantly to linguistic and translation theory. And mission strategists accept concepts such as indigenization without question. But missions has had to face the question on a more basic level, namely that of theological variety. What happens when an indigenous church interprets the Bible in terms of its own cognitive categories and assumptions? How do we cope with a Latin American theology, an Indian theology or a Marxist theology — all of which claim to be truly Christian?

Anthropologists, once caught up in the discovery of variety, are now turning back to the search for cultural and human universals. The extreme forms of cultural relativism are now almost dead. Chomsky and other linguists are seeking universals in the basic generative processes of language; Levi Strauss and other structuralists in the structure of the mind; Bateson, Berlin, Kay and others in common sense processes; and mathematical anthropologists in some fundamental order inherent in the nature of the universe itself. But anthropology is now beginning to face the question of a “Japanese anthropology,” an “Indian anthropology,” and a “Latin American anthropology.” Most of the advocates of these schools have been trained in the West, but they are calling into question the conceptual ethnocentrism of western anthropology.

Clearly, one of the most critical issues facing missions and anthropology alike is the need to develop post-colonial models of international relationships. These must deal, both on the conceptual and on the relational levels, with the recognition of cultural and national differences and autonomy on the one hand, and the need for cooperation and unity on the other.
Missions has gone much further than anthropology in developing post-colonial models. On the level of differences between individuals, it has recognized the importance of the familyhood of believers, and of special gifts and functions within a congregation. On the level of churches within a nation, missions has had to grapple with what the unity of Christ's body means. Today, one of the most pressing questions in missions is how should churches in different nations relate to one another. Some churches and mission boards recognize the autonomy of national churches and try to negotiate with them as equals. A few have set up international boards. But colonial survivals often persist in mission attitudes, finances, personnel, organizational structures and theology.

Many are beginning to find the basis for a post-colonial model of international church relationships in the concept of the Kingdom of God as this was outlined by Christ. When churches are seen as part of this kingdom, they can no longer be identified with the kingdoms of this world, and fragmented by their divisions. They are united, the rich and the poor, the young and the old, the big and the small, by a common Lord and a common mission. When leadership in the Kingdom is defined in terms of servanthood, then hierarchy, segregation, control, manipulation and exploitation are undermined, and colonialism ends. As Magalit points out, "God's kingdom does not have its headquarters in the United States or Canada or England" (1977:199).

Anthropology is only now beginning to search for a post-colonial model of relationships on the international scene. To date, a few international journals, conferences and boards have been established. For the most part the power controlling these lies in the West. In the face of growing criticism by third world scholars, it is becoming clear that anthropology has a long way to go not only in its theories but also in its organization before it can realize its claim to be an international science of man.

Epistemology

Just as a measure of understanding has been reached on the questions of humanness and variety, missions and anthropology are being caught up in a basic paradigm shift in epistemology\(^\text{12}\)
— a change in western thinking about the nature of knowledge itself — that demands a reassessment of science and theology.

In the nineteenth and early twentieth century, science was seen as a process by which laws existing in nature were discovered by the systematic use of the human senses, and organized into a growing body of knowledge. The scientist was considered a passive observer who saw accurately (with a one-to-one correspondence) and without bias an order that existed in nature itself. Therefore his statements were “true” for they corresponded to reality. Science was compared to a building in which each block of knowledge added to the temple of truth.

In recent years, this concept of knowledge has been challenged, as scientists became increasingly aware of the role the observer plays in creating knowledge. Eisenstein pointed out the theoretical implications of the fact that data is gathered from the vantage point of the observer. Whitehead (1938) showed the selective nature of knowledge. Piaget (1966) traced how children develop mental constructs in their attempts to understand and manipulate the external world. Bateson (1972), Berlin and Kay (1969) show how the senses themselves impose an order on experience. Freud raised the question of the role of the irrational subconscious on perception. Korbzybski (1933), Hayakawa (1964) and other linguists pointed out the operation of the mind and language in ordering human experience and thought. Kuhn (1972), Polanyi (1969) and others demonstrated the subjective nature of knowledge, and concluded that it is analogous to a map or model of external reality, and not that reality itself. It is clear that part of the order we perceive in knowledge exists in the external world, part is imposed by the senses and part is created by the mind. One of the most difficult questions facing science is to distinguish between these three.

But if knowledge is a map, it is not an absolute statement of reality, but an approximation of it. We then cannot speak of it as ultimately “true” or “false” in the old senses of these terms. The tests of a good map or model are its fit (the degree to which it conforms to our experiences), usefulness (how it helps us achieve what we set out to achieve), inclusiveness, uniformity, simplicity, aesthetic beauty and balance. Maps never give us the total picture — reality is infinitely greater than our knowledge of
Because they are approximations, maps are subject to addition, change and improvement as new knowledge is gained. Although maps are not absolute and complete statements of truth, this does not mean that they are arbitrary. "Approximation" must be differentiated from "relative". Maps must fit or reflect accurately a real world, a given, or an absolute.

Anthropology is caught in the middle of this paradigm shift. Many anthropologists still perceive scientific knowledge to be absolute statements of truth. They thereby deify rationality and the mind. Others are aware of the limitations of human knowledge and are more willing to live with open systems, with a measure of uncertainty and a greater dependence on faith, and with the need to include affect and the metaphysical in their understandings of the world.

The tensions of this paradigmatic shift in western thought are beginning to surface, in theology, in debates over the nature of theological knowledge and what is meant by the authority of scriptures. Unfortunately these debates generally take place only on the theological level and overlook the fact that many of the real issues arise out of differences in the underlying epistemologies. But for Christians the shift should be most welcome; for it brings us closer to the biblical perspective of the limits of human knowledge and of the importance of faith.

The shift is also welcome in missions. It provides a more adequate basis for Christian witness to non-Christians, and for the unity of the international Church in the midst of surface theological variations and multiple activities.

In many ways missions and anthropology have been like half-brothers — sharing, in part, a common parentage, raised in the same setting, quarrelling over the space and arguing the same issues. It is unfortunate that, at times, this has led to polarization and mutual hatred; for each had much to learn from the other. With the growing awareness among anthropologists that they must face the overwhelming problems of a real world which missionaries have faced so long, and among missionaries that they must deal with people within their sociocultural contexts which anthropology has studied, a greater mutual understanding and exchange of ideas seems possible.

Notes
1. The relationship between the colonial government and missions in the case of India is discussed by Smith (1966).
2. This is discussed further by Fred Voget (1975:128-249).
3. The epistemological paradigm shift noted below with its growing awareness that in studying others we are studying ourselves led to a self reflexivity in the social sciences that is making this position untenable.
4. See Merton's discussion of latent and manifest functions (1957).
5. Abner Cohn reports this was true of research carried out by Evans-Pritchard, Radcliffe-Brown, and Gluckman, to name a few. Further discussion of this is found in Kuper 1973:123-149, and in a spate of recent books dealing with anthropology and Marxism.
6. Some of the better contributions in this area have been made by Nida, Smalley, Reyburn, Loewen and others writing in Practical Anthropology and Missiology. One needs also to take into account the recent writings of the Christian implications of Transactional Analysis.
7. Pioneering work in this field has been done by Moltmann, Yoder (e.g. 1972) and by Orlando Costas.
8. This task has been undertaken by the cognitive anthropologists and those working in the new field of ethnoscience, as well as by Bateson (1972), Devereux (1967) and others who are approaching it from the perspective of Psychological Anthropology.
9. In missions one need but think of E.C. Dewick, H. Kraemer and A.C. Bouquet and many others. In anthropology early answers took the form of cultural relativism, but it soon became apparent that this position was untenable. Herskovits and Hoebel touched on the subject and more recently Marriot and others have taken up the discussion. It is interesting, in this regard, to look at the debates of the concepts “etic” and “emic”. A relativist position would define “etic” as any person’s analysis of another thought system in his own terms, and “emic” as his attempts to define it in terms of its own cognitive terms. But this use of the term “etic” is rejected, and it is now used only for a scientific language which is presumably more general and more analytically valid than other languages. See also Wilk’s recent review of Casteneda’s works (1977).
10. For an extended discussion of the situation see D’Andrade (1975).
11. It was interesting and, to missionaries, somewhat amusing to see the attention given in several issues of the Anthropology Newsletter (spring of 1976) to two graduate students in Guatemala who took some time out of their research to help victims of the earthquake rebuild a few houses — and to the use of funds collected by anthropologists which were given to the Friends Service Committee for use in the field (September 1977:5). There have also been a growing number of panels at the meetings of the American Anthropological Association on the subject of applied anthropology.
12. The term is used here as described by Kuhn (1972). For a brief critique of Kuhn see A.E. Rogge (1976:837-839).

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