

Involvement in
Subcultures:
Ethnicity and
Religion

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Ethnicity and religion provide the closest thing to a "critical experiment" for choosing between decline of community theories and diversity of communities theories. Ethnic and religious groups are usually considered "primordial" affiliations, fundamental commitments in the way that family and home are, and the sources of intense personal ties. Urbanism, according to decline theory, weakens ethnic and religious bonds, disperses members' loyalties, activities, and involvements, and thereby dissipates ethnic culture and religious coherence. According to subcultural theory, urbanism *bolsters* ethnic and religious community, particularly if the group is small enough so that affiliation is difficult. The bolstering involves selective migration, the attainment of critical mass, and intergroup friction—all greater in cities. Urbanism may also change the subcultures, as the ethnic and religious groups selectively accept cultural items from each other, or as they reorganize to face the challenge of urban diversity. Yet groups' borders, identities, and internal personal networks are sustained, even strengthened.

For both ethnicity and religion, our analysis of these issues proceeds by first asking who among our respondents were "members" of particular groups—that is, who among them clearly identified with a specific group and named at least one nonkin or affinal relative who was also a member. Second, we measure how socially tied to their subcultures members were by counting how many of the nonkin they named were also members.¹ Third, we briefly review community differences on other dimensions of involvement, such as belonging to a formal ethnic organization. Some paradoxical results emerge in this respect, and throughout we will consider how the effects of urban residence may depend on characteristics of the individual, specifically on his or her ethnicity, religion, religious commitment, and religious behavior.

Ethnicity

Americans, except those caught up in the "new ethnic..." do not typically see themselves as ethnics. In her analysis of surveys

ston and Kansas City, Diane Barthel found, as we also found, that many people insist they are "just Americans," even when they obviously have a foreign heritage. According to her study, most Americans deny that their national origin makes them unique, claim "no special comfort around their ethnic fellows," deny any ethnic pride, and apparently prefer that ethnicity "remain on a 'team sport' level of identification."² We are interested in, first, which northern Californians went beyond ethnic rooting to be at least marginal members of ethnic groups.

Membership

We asked our respondents this question (q. 89):

Some people describe themselves by their race, ethnicity, or national background. On page 7 of the [answer] booklet are some examples of those descriptions (Chinese, Italian, Black, Irish, Portuguese, Chicano/Mexican-American, Russian, Basque, Filipino, Arab, Greek, Japanese). How would you describe yourself?

Respondents who gave answers such as "American," "white," or "none" were not asked the subsequent questions. Respondents who gave more than one ethnicity were asked, "Is (either/any) of these more important to you (than the other/s)?" Of the 643 respondents who gave any appropriate ethnic identity, 491 named only one or picked a more important one. We asked these respondents, "Are any people on the list of names also [of that ethnicity]?" Of these, 287 respondents checked off at least one nonrelative or one affinal relative as a fellow ethnic. I classified these 287 as members of an ethnic group. The largest sets of respondents were Irish, Italian, black, Mexican, and German. In all, 27 percent of our sample is ethnic for this analysis.³

Respondents who had been raised abroad, and black, Mexican, Asian, Jewish, and Catholic respondents were especially likely to be part of this 27 percent. Little else distinguished the ethnics among our respondents⁴—except place of residence. Semirural respondents were notably less likely to be members of ethnic groups than were respondents in larger communities: 14 percent, compared with 29, 30, and 34 percent of Town, Metropolitan, and Core respondents, respectively.⁵ These statistics probably *underestimate* the true difference in northern California, because our survey included neither blacks in predominantly black neighborhoods nor people who did not speak English—both prone to be ethnic group members and to live in Core communities.⁶ The implication of this difference, whatever its cause may be, is that urban life and ethnicity tend to go together.

The explanation of the difference is largely self-selection; that is, the foreign-reared, nonwhites, Jews, and Catholics tend to live in and move to

the most urban places. Nevertheless, when self-selection factors are taken into account, some difference remains: Semirural respondents were still slightly less likely to be ethnic group members than otherwise identical respondents living elsewhere.⁷

The community differences could be explained by the tendency of the most self-conscious and segregated ethnic groups to congregate in cities, though some social scientists argue persuasively that it is city residence *itself* that makes such groups cohesive.⁸ Yet an additional aspect of urbanism besides selective attraction must account for the remaining contrast between Semirural and other respondents. It is probably the simple lack of numbers, of fellow ethnics, in small towns. The potential difficulties of minorities in small towns are illustrated by the Korean man in a Semirural community who drove with his family an hour and a half to attend a Korean church in Sacramento, and by a black man in a small town who, after having "passed" for many years, was uncovered, fired from his job, and ostracized.

Depth of Social Involvement

Among the 287 ethnic group members in our sample, the ones who named the most nonkin members of their own groups tended to be black, Jewish, Asian, or Mexican-American—and not to be Irish or Northern European. And the more urban the community, the *more* fellow ethnics they named, a threefold increase from 1.0 in Semirural to 3.0 in Core communities (see fig. 27);⁹ in percentage terms, from 18 to 38 percent of all nonkin.¹⁰ The urban population, these findings suggest, is distinct not only in its ethnic composition but also in the extent of involvement resident ethnics had with fellow members.

Other findings show that the urban ethnics were more likely to belong to ethnic organizations or read ethnic magazines and to express some ideological commitment to their group than were small-town ethnics.¹¹ (And, as in the case of membership, the findings here underestimate urban involvement; they do not reflect, for example, the thousands of recent, non-English-speaking immigrants from Hong Kong in Chinatown, or undocumented immigrants from Latin America in San Francisco's Mission District.) These results portray the city as a mosaic of intense ethnic worlds rather than as a landscape of ethnic disintegration.

Selective migration—blacks, the foreign-born, Jews, and Catholics tend to live in larger towns—accounts for most the differences in depth of involvement. Controlling for these and other types of self-selection—by education, age, and so forth—substantially reduces the effects of urbanism (see lower dashed line in figure 27). The trend, not statistically significant largely because we have only 287 ethnics, still indicates that




Fig. 27. Number of fellow ethnics and of other nonkin named by ethnics, by urbanism.

ethnics in the urban places, especially in the Core, named about 45 percent more fellow ethnics than they would have if they had lived in small communities.¹² (They would not, however, have been more organizationally active or ideologically invested.)¹³

Another aspect of subcultural involvement is the extent to which members associate with people *outside* the group. The fewer outside ties, the more encapsulated the individual's network, and probably the more firmly bound he or she is to the group. Mexicans, blacks, and the foreign-reared were especially likely, and Western Europeans were especially unlikely, to be cut off from outsiders, other factors held constant. Figure 27—top, solid line—shows that there was no straightforward connection between living in urban places and how many out-group nonkin respondents named. But the *adjusted* figures indicate a slight decline as urbanism increases; respondents in urban places would have named slightly fewer out-group members than their counterparts in small communities.¹⁴ If we combine the adjusted two trends shown in figure 27 and calculate the ratio of out- to in-group associates, the figures summarize a tendency that might well be labeled "ghettoization." Semirural ethnics named an adjusted 4.1 out-group associates for each in-group associate, Town ethnics named 2.7, Metropolitan named 3.0, and Core ethnics named 2.2 out-

siders for each side. Urban residents may not be isolated as individuals, but urban ethnics may be more *collectively* isolated from the wider society than otherwise comparable small-town ethnics.¹⁵

Specific Groups

The connection between where respondents lived and their ethnic involvement varied from one ethnic group to another. Since the number of respondents in each group is quite small—the largest set is composed of fifty-seven Irish-Americans—and group members are unevenly distributed—for example, only one Italian lived in a Semirural place and only two Germans lived in Core communities—we cannot say much about particular ethnicities.¹⁶ But the case of Mexican-Americans is particularly instructive.

The urban Mexican-Americans tended to be relatively *uninvolved* with other Mexican-Americans; those living in Town communities were most heavily involved with one another. Mexicans are unique, however, in *not* being relatively concentrated in the large urban centers; for historical and economic reasons, people of Mexican descent form a greater proportion of the Central Valley population than of the Bay Area population. And, in our data, the greater the *relative* concentration of Mexican-Americans in and near a community, the higher the proportion of fellow Mexican-Americans our respondents named. That is, while urbanism went together with fewer Mexican-American friends, the concentration of Mexican-Americans went together with more in-group ties.¹⁷ This particular case suggests that the massing of a specific group, particularly relative to other groups, is more important than urbanism per se.

Conclusion

If ethnicity poses a "critical experiment," then our results are not nearly as clear-cut as we would wish. Nevertheless, they indicate that urbanism—or at least the concentration of specific ethnic groups—more often bolsters than breaks down ethnicity. As the urbanism of the community increased, respondents were more likely to be "ethnics." Although much of that difference could be explained by self-selection, Semirural respondents were still less likely to be members of ethnic groups than were similar respondents living elsewhere. And the more urban the community, the more involved member respondents were with other members. Much of this, too, can be explained by self-selection. But remaining community differences point to urban bolstering of ethnicity (particularly if the Mexican case is set aside); certainly, little in the data suggests that city life weakens ethnicity.

Two aspects of the results call for caution: weak trends and inconsistency between social involvement and other forms. First, some of the adjusted results are modest and not statistically significant. In part this reflects the role of a group's relative population concentration in promoting ethnic involvement, as illustrated by the Mexican case. Such concentration is typically, but not universally, associated with total population concentration, or urbanism. (Italians, as another example, are concentrated both in San Francisco and in the wine-producing Napa Valley.) In part, also, our estimates of urbanism's correlation with ethnicity are *conservative*, for reasons mentioned earlier. Despite the modesty of the trends, other recent research supports some of the elements of the argument: that ethnic attachments persist in urban areas, and that group size is a critical contributor to ethnic persistence.¹⁸

Second, while urbanism was generally associated with more ethnic social involvement, even encapsulation, it was not associated in any straightforward way with other aspects of ethnic involvement—ideological commitment, organizational ties, and so on. I had imagined that all aspects of involvement would work together, but the empirical results force some rethinking. Although the inconsistencies between social and other types of involvement might be explained by technical problems in measuring involvement, a more interesting possibility is that they reflect *changes* in ethnicity resulting from urbanism.

There is evidence that city life alters ethnic groups and membership, that it modifies culture, language, and even specific identity (for example, changing self-definitions from "Neopolitan" to "Italian"), while still sustaining in-group ties and distinctive ethnic behavior. Peter Rose's study of Jews in small-town New York and their children illustrates the point. He found that the small-town Jews tended to be more conscious of their identity than Jews who lived in the city; they often saw themselves as representatives of the faith to a Gentile community. Their consciousness was also bound up with a desire to see their children live in a large city, where they felt that keeping the faith was more likely. The key difference between town and city was the lack of Jewish friends and a Jewish community in the small towns. The children who had moved to the city, ironically, felt that they had weaker Jewish identities, for many probably because they did live in Jewish milieus.¹⁹ With a comfortable cultural environment, urban Jews may be less conscious of who they are and yet more involved with fellow Jews and perhaps more distinctively Jewish in their way of life.

Our data are mildly consistent with such a view of ethnicity, though we have no real indicators of ethnic life-style. As urbanism increases, ethnic involvement may be less conscious and purposeful, but more social and deeper.

These arguments should not imply that city life is always more ethnic than rural life or that a particular ethnicity will persist forever. Obviously, Irishness remains stronger in rural Ireland than in San Francisco, and San Francisco's Irish are probably becoming less distinctive with every passing generation. The real implication is that ethnic social networks, and whatever comes with them, such as distinctive life-styles, are likelier to persist in the urban centers than in the small towns of any given society.

Religion

The issues raised by religious involvement are much the same as those raised by ethnic involvement. In the classic theoretical view, the collapse of faith and of religious fellowship (the two are, we shall see, linked but far from identical) under the influence of urbanization is yet another way that community disintegrates.

In contemporary America, adherence to traditional articles of faith is less common in urban places than in small towns.²⁰ In our sample, residents of the Regional Core were much more likely than other respondents to say "none" in answer to the question, "What religion are you—Protestant, Roman Catholic, Jewish, or something else?" (q. 93): 39 percent of Core respondents said "none," compared with 20 percent of Metropolitan, 14 percent of Town, and 16 percent of Semirural respondents. (This, of course, is a test not of faith, but of allegiance.) Yet, among the 78 percent of respondents who did claim a religious identity, the differences by community in the extent of their religious fellowship were not as great, and in certain instances, were exactly the opposite—urbanites were more involved. As with ethnicity, there are hints that social involvement and self-consciousness may separate in urban communities.

Being a Religionist

I classified a respondent as a member of a religious group if he or she claimed a religious identity in the question just described and also named at least one person other than a blood relative who was of the same religion. For Protestants with a denominational allegiance, *same religion means same denomination*: 52 percent of the respondents were, by this definition, religionists.²¹

Respondents who had been raised as Catholics or as Jews were more likely to be religionists, while respondents who had been raised in liberal Protestant denominations were least likely to be members of a denominational subculture.²² Middle-aged, but not elderly, respondents were likely to be religionists. And parents were especially likely to be religionists,

weight to the stereotype that the church is sought out for children.

The community differences in membership are irregular. Town and Metropolitan respondents were most likely to be religionists, at 61 and 53 percent respectively. Core and Semirural respondents were least likely, at 44 and 48 percent respectively.²⁴ This inverted-U pattern seems to reflect two trends: the tendency of Core respondents to profess no religion at all and the tendency of Semirural respondents to name no nonkin co-religionists at all. This latter trend is especially acute for Semirural respondents not raised as Protestants, suggesting that non-Protestants risked "falling away," or religious isolation, or both, by living in small towns.²⁵ In sum, living in *large* towns but away from the Bay Area encouraged being a member of a religious subculture.

Depth of Social Involvement

When we consider only the 550 religionists, this curvilinearity disappears: the more urban the community, the *more* nonkin co-religionists respondents named, from 1.8 for Semirural residents to 3.3 for Core residents (see Fig. 28).²⁶ Urban religionists tended to name more nonkin of their own faith or denomination than did small-town religionists largely because they tended more often to be unmarried and educated. Had all respondents been equal in these respects and in the specific religion they professed, the community differences would have appeared as the lower dashed line in figure 28. Core respondents would have named just slightly more and Semirural respondents just slightly fewer than an average number of co-religionists.²⁷

Figure 28 also shows the association between urbanism and naming nonkin outside the faith. "Ghettoization" seems, all else equal, slightly greater in Town and Core than in Metropolitan and Semirural places.²⁸

These findings provide little thrust for my theoretical argument, but they move us roughly in the direction of believing that urbanism more likely supports rather than weakens the subcultural involvement of religious people. That drive accelerates when we examine specific subgroups.

Urban residence tended especially to affect the social involvement of several kinds of respondents—women and affluent people, for example. Three such groups deserve special examination: Catholics, respondents who rarely if ever attended church services, and respondents who told us that religion was "most important" to them. For each of these three sets, the more urban the community, the more co-religionists they named. On the other hand, for Protestants, for regular churchgoers, and for those who did not identify most strongly with religion, urbanism was largely




Fig. 28. Number of fellow religionists and of other nonkin named by religionists, by urbanism.

irrelevant. Figure 29 provides an overview of the following discussion. In simplified form it shows how urban respondents in each of the three critical categories tended—other factors held constant—to name more co-religionists than their small-town counterparts, while in the residual category urban respondents named slightly fewer than did their small-town counterparts.²⁹

Consider Catholics first. Core Catholics named considerably more Catholic nonkin (3.7) and the twenty-one Semirural Catholics named considerably fewer (1.3) than did otherwise similar Catholics living in between. For Protestants, urbanism made little difference. In terms of the *percentage* of nonkin who were co-religionists, urbanism actually tended to depress slightly the number of nonkin of the same denomination whom Protestants named.³⁰ My explanation is that urbanism largely expands the possibilities of subcultural involvement for members of minorities. In this instance the minority is Catholic; knowing other Catholics is difficult in small communities, but not in urban places. (Presumably, had our sample been large enough, we could have shown this to be true also of Jews, Christian Scientists, and so on.) For Protestants, however, finding other Protestants—either by meeting people of the same denomination or by switching denominations—is about equally easy almost anywhere.³¹




Fig. 29. Number of nonkin co-religionists named, by urbanism, for subgroups of respondents (adjusted).

Second, Core respondents who never attended religious services named more than twice as many co-religionists as did otherwise similar church-shunners in Semirural communities.³² Put another way, in the smallest places, nonattenders named far fewer co-religionists than did their neighbors who went to services regularly, but in the largest places the attenders and the nonattenders named almost equally many co-religionists. (Note: Urban religionists generally attended services less often than small-town ones.)

A guide to understanding this finding is Gerhard Lenski's distinction between *associational* religion, involvement in church and church-related groups, and *communal* religion, involvement with friends and relatives who are co-religionists. He argues that modern, urban life separates these

two forms of religious involvement.³³ Churches are the associational institutions of religious subcultures. As such, I would argue, they are critical for forming social ties in small or dispersed communities that lack the communal institutions for religious fellowship that are available in large cities—informal social circles, clubs, neighborhood handouts, lodges, newspapers, political leadership, and so on. In the small town, religious subcultures either exist around the local church or do not exist at all. A few points in our data support this interpretation: nonattenders in Semirural places were virtually shut out of social involvement with co-religionists; the co-religionists whom Semirural respondents named were most likely to be neighbors and townsmen (54 percent lived within five minutes, compared with 40 percent of Core respondents' co-religionists); and in chapter 10 we found that Semirural respondents were especially likely to name people from religious organizations. All these items suggest that the local church plays a greater and perhaps functionally necessary role in the religious subcultures of small but not of large communities.³⁴

Third, among those respondents who said that religion was "most important" to them (choosing among work, ethnicity, pastime, and religion; q. 100)—forty-eight fundamentalist Protestants, sixteen other Protestants, eighteen Catholics, one Jew, and fifteen others (largely Mormons)—the urban ones named considerably more co-religionists than did their counterparts living in smaller communities.³⁵ The two groups—strong and weak identifiers—named about equally many co-religionists in small communities but differed greatly in urban places, where the strong identifiers named many more. Because of the relatively few respondents in this group—only eleven Core residents, for example were strong identifiers—the finding is not statistically reliable. But the differences are large, as the line in figure 29 shows, and thus worthy of attention.³⁶ Furthermore, strong and weak identifiers differed in the same way with respect to how near their co-religionists lived. Among those who said religion was not most important, urbanites were *less* likely to live in the same community as their co-religionists; but among those who said religion was most important, the more urban their community, the *more* likely they were to live near their co-religionists. That is, for respondents who cared most about their religious identity, urbanism meant *more* and *nearer* co-religionists; for those who did not stress religion, urbanism meant no more and somewhat more distant co-religionists.

We should pause in this headlong rush through the maze of findings to note the paradox of the last two sets of results. Seriously religious people are typically likely to attend services often.³⁷ Yet we found that urbanism encouraged social involvement for those strongly identified with their religion and also for *nonattenders*. This complex pattern can be described in another, perhaps more revealing way. Social involvement with co-

religionists may be either the result of church attendance, with or without deep religiousness, or it can be the result of deep religiousness, with or without church membership. (Although very religious people typically attended services, some did not. A few, for example, watched television evangelists.) In Semirural places, social involvement was largely dependent on church attendance; strong or weak religious identification made little difference. In more urban places, the two—attendance and identification—were equally important sources of social involvement.³⁸ To use Lenski's concepts, the associational and communal aspects of the religious subculture seem more closely linked in small places; in particular, church attendance was required for social ties. In large communities the two separate; one can be tied to co-religionists without attending services, especially if one feels strongly about religion.

The main point, these complexities aside, is that urbanism apparently promoted social involvement with co-religionists among three particular groups: Catholics, nonattenders, and respondents who said that religion was most important to them. What these disparate categories have in common is the people they jointly exclude: modestly religious people with easy access to co-religionists, such as Protestants who attend their nearest church as a regular social activity. For the latter kind of people, the fellowship of co-religionists is neither pressing nor troublesome, and community of residence makes little difference. For those who did find religion a pressing concern, or meeting co-religionists a problem, or both, population concentration supported social involvement in a religious subculture.³⁹

Other Aspects of Religious Involvement

Community differences in other aspects of religious involvement showed a similar but fainter pattern. Overall, urban respondents were slightly *less* involved than the small-town respondents, but there were countertrends among Catholics, nonattenders, and, especially, among those who said religion was most important.

Although there was a slight tendency for *formal* religious activity—belonging to a religious organization (other than a church), such as a choir or charity, or subscribing to religious periodicals—to decline as the urbanism of respondents' communities increased, this tended not to be true among nonattenders, and it was quite the reverse for respondents who said religion was most important. For the latter, the more urban, the more formally active they were. For those who cared much, urbanism apparently encouraged formal activity as well as social ties.⁴⁰

Church attendance itself is a unique and complex indicator of subcultural involvement. Going to services combines devotion, the opportunity

to associate with co-religionists, and formal organizational activity (but most strongly the latter, and attendance is *not* clearly linked to faith).⁴¹ Churches and synagogues are organizations for community involvement and child-rearing, as well as places of prayer. We see signs of the nonreligious role among our own respondents. The more educated they were and the more children they had, the more regularly they attended—but only if they said religion was *not* most important to them. (Being educated and having children made no difference in whether serious religionists attended often.) That is, *associational* reasons seemingly impelled people who were casual about their religion to attend. In any event, urbanism tended to *depress* attendance at services among all our religionists (and especially among fundamentalist and “other” Protestants).^{42, 43}

Conclusion

Summarizing in broad strokes, urban residence did *not* reduce the involvement of respondents in religious subcultures, and for some types of respondents living in urban places seemed to increase their involvement, particularly their social involvement. I can also offer a more fine-grained synthesis of the findings. Urbanism seemed to have three consequences, two of which in turn depressed involvement, and one strong but conditional one that in turn increased involvement.

First, people living in urban places tend to absorb nontraditional beliefs (see chap. 6). That means, in contemporary America, that they tend to be less orthodox and to have less faith in organized religion. Thus, in our study, urbanites were less willing to claim a religion at all and, among those who did, less likely to say religion was most important and less likely to attend services than were their small-town counterparts. Second, among religionists, those living in urban places were less likely to be involved in the *associational* dimension of their membership. In small towns, I suggest, the church is part of the neighborhood-kin-church complex of social relations and is an important context for knowing people.⁴⁴ Those who do not attend church typically do not know co-religionists. In cities, there are other contexts and other opportunities for social relations, so the church is less attractive in that way, and urbanites are therefore less likely to meet co-religionists there. (In fact, were it *not* for their more regular church attendance, small-town Protestants would have been *less* socially involved with members of their denominations than were urban Protestants.)⁴⁵

But, third, the countervailing effect of urbanism is to increase people's access to the *communal* dimension of their membership. The aggregation, to a critical mass, of fellow religionists in and around the community increases the possibility of social ties and fosters institutions besides the

h. This consequence of urbanism is especially likely to outweigh the first two among minorities, for whom finding associates is a problem; infrequent church attenders, who lack that organization as a regular setting for seeing people; and the deeply religious, who seek greater involvement than possible with conventional religious activity.⁴⁶

The findings for those three groups depict, albeit faintly, the following picture. In the small town, there is typically one diffuse religious community, a Protestant one, also incorporating local neighborhood ties. For conventional Protestants, going to the nearby church regularly is a sure way of knowing co-religionists. They can do this anywhere, village or metropolis, but are a bit more likely to do so in small towns. In terms of making social ties, the town/city distinction means little to them. For other people, just any nearby church will not provide communal relations. These people may be non-Protestants, Protestants who care greatly about a specific denomination, or people who do not like church services. Whatever the reason, in small towns they are isolated from co-religionists; only the population concentration in large towns and cities allows them to find fellowship. For the seriously religious, the small-town church provides some but not enough involvement. In cities they are able to become more active and more deeply engrossed in a religious subculture.

In the city, the religious community is sharply differentiated; there are plural communities. One dimension of plurality, of course, is theological: Catholics, orthodox Jews, Zen Buddhists, and so on, have their own social worlds. More important theoretically is differentiation by type of involvement. Many urbanites do without religion altogether. Another set of people are involved communally but not associationally. Like the Catholic who swears to his Catholic friends that his wife will never drag him to Mass, or the backsliding Southern Baptist now living in the big city and hanging out with fellow ex-Southerners, these people have a religious community without explicit religion. And then there is the relative handful of very religious people who are more deeply involved socially and organizationally in a religious subculture than is usually possible in a small town.

These distinctions recall the arguments made earlier with respect to ethnicity, that urbanism may separate and alter elements of ethnic involvement. Urban ethnics may be less self-conscious and formal about their membership and yet seem to be more immersed in an ethnic social world than their small-town cousins. Urban religionists may be less devotional, and yet many seem to be more immersed to a religious community than their small-town fellows. Urbanism may provide multiple bases of subcultural involvement and perhaps multiple versions of such subcultures, or multiple communities, to join.