lihood upon gifts from the laity. [*See also* Mendicancy.] Their only home or shelter was to be the trees of the forest, small huts constructed of leaves and branches, or natural or artificially constructed caves. Later, wealthy lay people donated more elaborate and permanent dwellings to monastic communities and, as with many Christian monastic groups, some Buddhist monasteries came to be richly endowed, their resources allowing their residents to wield considerable influence in their neighborhood.

From its earliest history, Christianity has ascribed great value to voluntary poverty, viewing it as one of the more effective means to personal holiness. Built upon the belief that Christ, as Son of God, modeled a poverty of spirit in choosing to come to earth to redeem a fallen humanity, poverty emerged as one of the three basic vows of monastics endeavoring to emulate him. Along with chastity and obedience, it acquired the status of an evangelical precept based upon the words of Christ, in this case his advice to a wealthy youth: "If you would be perfect, go sell what you have, give it to the poor, and come follow me" (*Mt.* 19:21). By denying themselves material possessions and sometimes even their use, monastics are considered co-workers with Christ in restoring the world to a lost primordial state of innocence and bliss. This principle of poverty was later established by the church as one of the official vows to be accepted by monastics at the time of ordination.

Throughout Christian history, the spirit and observance of poverty within a given religious order has varied according to the impetus of its founder and the economic standards of the time. Over the centuries, circumstances have continually demanded adaptations to new conditions and changing fortunes. Monastic poverty, which became prevalent during the fourth and fifth centuries, bears the marks of the rural poverty that predominated during those centuries and even into the feudal period, while the poverty of the later mendicant orders (e.g., the Franciscans and Dominicans) reflects the influence of the development of urban society. Often, as religious communities flourished and large landholdings were donated to them, corporate wealth replaced poverty altogether and, in some instances, new foundations were established in protest against luxuries that were perceived, at least by some members (e.g., the Cistercians and Carthusians), as inimical to the spirit and practice of the original vows. In practice, observance of the vow of poverty was intimately related to the vow of obedience, in that overseers of the communities could and did determine which possessions might be retained by individual members. After the Protestant Reformation in the sixteenth century, many religious communities were abolished and, within Protestant groups, formal vows of poverty were replaced by emphasis on almsgiving and the support of needy members of the congregation. [*See also* Almsgiving.]

In Islam, poverty of spirit as an aspect of *zuhd* (self-denial) developed gradually from the idea of abstinence from sin to that of abstinence from material goods and sensual pleasures. Poverty's inclusion in the ascetic life is usually attributed to an utterance of Muḥammad: "Poverty is my glory." Muḥammad himself exercised voluntary poverty and instructed his followers to be moderate in acquiring possessions. Communities of ascetics arose during the first centuries of Islamic history, but asceticism as a way of life became more prevalent among later groups of mystics, such as the Ṣūfīs, for whom poverty was adopted as one of the six "chief stations" of spirituality. There has been some disagreement among Ṣūfīs themselves, and between various other Muslim groups, about whether it is more meritorious to practice poverty as an expression of love for and trust in God or whether it is better to be wealthy and grateful to God for his beneficence. Most Ṣūfīs, however, hold that a person who desires union with God will recognize in poverty an efficacious means of achieving liberation from all that distracts from God. To the commonly used word *faqīr* ("poor one"), Ṣūfī ascetics have given a spiritual sense indicative of a "poverty of spirit" that acknowledges one's need of God.

In modern times, there is evidence of a growing movement at the grass-roots level of many religious traditions, both Eastern and Western, to organize communities dedicated to fostering simpler lives based on sufficiency rather than luxury. As new cultural conditions create new needs and options, both the spirit and the practice of poverty continue to be reexamined.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Brandon, S. G. F., ed. *A Dictionary of Comparative Religion.* London, 1970.

Clasen, Sophronius. "Poverty." In *New Catholic Encyclopedia,* edited by William J. McDonald, vol. 11. New York, 1967.

Knoop, Douglas. "Poverty." In *Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics,* edited by James Hastings, vol. 10. Edinburgh, 1918.

Parrinder, Geoffrey. *Dictionary of Non-Christian Religions.* Philadelphia, 1971.

Spiro, Melford E. *Buddhism and Society.* 2d. enl. ed. Berkeley, 1982.

Stutley, Margaret, and James Stutley. *A Dictionary of Hinduism.* London, 1977.

ROSEMARY RADER

POWER. The term *kratophany* literally rendered is "the appearance of power." Mircea Eliade, however, who

made this a technical term in English, used it to indicate an appearance of the sacred in which the experience of power dominates. Thus, that every kratophany must be, at the same time, a hierophany ("appearance of the sacred") is certain by definition, while the converse is less clear; indeed, assent to it will hinge upon the degree to which one regards the concept or experience of power to be an irreducible part of the concept or experience of the sacred. [*See* Hierophany.]

That the idea of power is central to much religious experience can be seen by means of a simple mental exercise: try to imagine hierophany without the elements of awesomeness, authority, or effectiveness. Most will agree that it is possible to imagine intellectual constructs such as truth or value without power, but hierophany seems to require more. Here is one difference between philosophy and religion, between the intellectual grasp of an idea and the experience of a sacred reality: the religious experience involves the whole personality and not merely the intellect. It includes the emotions as well as less obvious aspects of human awareness such as the kinesthetic sense and deep instinctual and symbolic structures. Finally, it may be that the sense of reality and the sensing of power are inextricably combined into what is experienced as a unity that might be labeled "real presence." As a category of modern physics, power can be described as a potentiality, or a potential ability to do "work," which in turn implies the expenditure of energy to change the distribution of energy in a given system, just as water piled up behind a hydroelectric dam has great potential for generating electricity because of its advantageous location with respect to the direction of gravitational forces. Unlike water, however, the sacred always remains potential even after awesome power has been expended, and it is this mysterious characteristic of being an inexhaustible source of power that in part gives to hierophany its paradoxical tendency both to attract and to repulse.

The normal reactions to sacred power within a given culture can conveniently be classified under the rubrics of *mana* and *taboo. Mana* implies a positive attitude toward power within an object or symbol or person—power that can be appropriated for useful purposes. *Taboo* implies the opposite, namely, power in an object or symbol or person that must be avoided for safety's sake or at least hedged about with special "insulating" rites before it can be made useful. Examples are amulets and charms, holy books, saints' relics, and living sacred persons. Infraction of such governing rules constitutes sacrilege and usually brings down cultural or cultic sanctions upon the guilty, or even the direct intervention of sacred power itself.

Perhaps the most important, because clearest, example of the role played by power in religion can be seen by examination of the meaning of cosmogonic myths and of what appears to be the psychological reality that informs them, namely, the universal experience of the prestige of origins. Here, above all, is demonstrated the positive side of sacred power in its intrinsic creativity. Here is the power to bring a world into being, to shape reality, and thereby to found human cults and cultures. It is literally true that within cosmogonic myths everything that happens is a unique demonstration of creative power, since everything that happens does so for the first time. Examples abound, but consider only the Dreaming adventures of many sacred beings in Australian tribal religions, where the seemingly trivial acts performed while traveling around the countryside actuall[illegible]ate the landscape and populate it with sacred places gravid with meaning. Or consider the Shintō myths in which with nearly every gesture of the gods—whether by sexual contact, by breaking or cutting something, or by uttering special words—new deities came into existence, deities whose intimate relationship with nature and culture made them constitutive of the world.

More dramatic examples may be found in the Hebrew scriptures, in the *Book of Job*, for example, where frequent references are made to God's creative power in ordering the world and controlling the awesome forces of the cosmic ocean. As the text comes down to us, Job's response is one of terror and repentance without understanding. The Hindu classic *Bhagavadgītā* provides another forceful revelation of the sacred as power in Arjuna's trembling witness to Lord Kṛṣṇa's true nature: nothing less than the world process is portrayed in the deity's simultaneous destructive function as death and his creative function as the womb of all beings.

Power and Theories of the Origins of Religion. Although scattered speculations can be found in the classical civilizations of China, India, and Greece, theoretical reconstructions of the possible origins of religion stem in their modern forms from the European encounter with those cultures that, from about the time of the Enlightenment until a few decades ago, were known collectively as "the savages." Knowledge of these so-called primitive (or archaic, or nonliterate) peoples made a strong impression on the Western imagination. Among other things, it played an important role in the foundation during the nineteenth century of such academic disciplines as psychology, sociology, and anthropology. Perhaps because many of the more detailed accounts of such cultures came from religious professionals and perhaps also because it was an age in the West of great religious ferment, the discovery of primitive cultures was both a discovery of exotic social cus-

toms and of strange and disquieting systems of belief and ritual. The most significant systematic attempt of this period to reconstruct a "natural history" of religion was E. B. Tylor's *Primitive Culture* (1871). There the theory of animism was first propounded.

Tylor defined *animism* as belief, or a tendency toward belief, that all nature was endowed with a spiritual, animating essence, or soul. Thus, by anthropomorphizing analogy, every natural power or object was directed by a personality possessing intellect and will. According to this theory, all things were supposed by our primitive ancestors to be humanlike—if not in outward appearance, then in their inner being. Power was implied in this view in that the power of being of every thing, its uniqueness and its efficacy, was assumed to be potentially greater than what we would call its mere physical possibilities. Yet the experiences that lay behind this animistic worldview were not, in Tylor's view, fundamentally of power, with its exciting, often daunting emotional concomitants, but were instead of a different and more coolly logical kind. He reasoned that primitives must have been perplexed by their own dreams and thoughts, in which they themselves as well as other people, both living and dead, and not present in the usual sense, appeared. Adding this to their own natural experience of themselves as thinking, willing, self-moving beings, primitives must have concluded that a soul, or animating principle, must inhere in all things and that it could sometimes be separated from the body. In this way, Tylor sought not only to explain primitive beliefs but also to define a proto-religious stage of cultural evolution. Religion, or more strictly the prerequisite for religion, he went on to define as "a belief in spiritual beings." Animism, then, is but one type of religion, namely, the belief that all things have souls, or, as it were, both a material and a spiritual "body" or aspect.

Tylor's theory of animism, and indeed his view of religion as a phenomenon that properly encompasses both primitive and so-called higher forms in a unified theory, provided the *locus classicus* of most anthropological work, including [illegible] formation of new theories, until well past the turn of the century. The main thrust of theorizing in this period was to reconstruct the origins of religious behavior itself, that is, to isolate the most elementary impulse, feeling, or experience that constituted the *sine qua non* of religion, and to place all forms of religious behavior on an evolutionary scale of development from this point of origin. It should be noted here that a shift in emphasis in anthropological studies occurred in an early reaction to what was deemed by many to be Tylor's excessively intellectualist view of human nature, at least as it was displayed regarding primitives. Increasingly anthropologists viewed human beings primarily as active creatures whose thought processes are subordinated to action: thought "rationalizes" action to the degree that ideas are formed only in reaction to deeds and to provide a more or less emotionally satisfying intellectual justification for them. It is here that the idea of power, in a variety of forms, began to play its part in the great quest for origins.

Animatism is the name given to a theory, formulated by R. R. Marett, that sought to build upon the work of Tylor. Although he accepted animism as a higher stage in religious development, Marett rejected the "intellectualist fallacy" inherent in the theory of animism insofar as it claimed to represent the first stage of religion. He suggested instead that primitives experience the world as fundamentally divided into the familiar and the unfamiliar. The unfamiliar object is so because it exhibits some sort of strangeness suggestive of hidden power. This he called variously "occult power" and "the sacred." To the compound of unusual and hidden power he added the notion of life in much the same sense that Tylor had used *animus*, that is, life or soul, except that he believed that, at the stage of animatism, the primitive mind had not yet made the leap from life or life force to separable soul. This meant that animatism could also properly be understood as "preanimism." [*See* Animism and Animatism.]

The full articulation of this theory was published in 1909 in Marett's *The Threshold of Religion*, but as early as 1900, he had made the first steps toward it in his establishment of the Oceanic word *mana* as a general category of religious experience. He based his usage primarily upon the work of R. H. Codrington (see *The Melanesians*, 1891), who reported that for many South Pacific island cultures, the religious system was based upon a single concept, which they called *mana*. Among the Melanesians, *mana*, the power that inhered in all things, had special significance for their religious and social system, because it could be concentrated in some objects and because it inhered in a concentrated form in some people. Indeed, the hierarchical structure of their society was justified upon the basis of the aristocrats' inborn great *mana*. Everything possessed some *mana*, and, in this respect, the term might be translated "the power of being." Since so much was made of its concentratability, however, in many cases the term is better rendered as "sacred." But for many scholars, particularly in the nineteenth century, this usage permitted an unacceptable broadening of the meaning of *sacred*, since *mana* could be transferred from one object or person to another. Many tended to classify this notion not as religious but as pertaining to magic. The flu-

idity of *mana* made it a kind of physical energy, or at least analogous to such an energy: the transfer could be affected by touching one *mana*-charged object with another with less *mana;* in particular, a person of high *mana* could infuse an object with some of his or her *mana* by handling it.

It was not long after the publication of Codrington's findings that similar discoveries began to be made in other parts of the world. American anthropologists were especially active at this time, and the Huron *orenda,* the Lakota *wakan,* and the Algonquin *manitou* were soon added to the list of *mana*-like concepts. Later the Arabic *barakah* and East Asian terms such as the Chinese *ling-pao* and the Japanese *kami* were suggested as counterparts to the Melanesian idea of *mana.* From such evidence, Marett then posited a general psychological tendency of human beings to experience the world as well as themselves under the guise of a controlling religious concept: sacred or occult power. This view has had great influence among scholars. However, contemporary anthropology does not generally accept Marett's insistence that even the most elementary religious experience engrafts to the notion of power the assumption of personality—or, to put it another way, that *mana* and animatism are necessarily combined. It may, of course, be true in certain cultures, as he argued, that because *mana* most powerfully manifested itself in certain types of persons, it was treated as if it were the willpower of a human being, but it is not true in all cultures. And the value of the term *mana* is just in its use as a general descriptive category denoting a sacred power that is not in itself personal. Thus, in fact, the modern usage implies a psychological, if not necessarily chronological, priority to the idea of *mana* over even Marett's animatism.

Power and the Nature of Religion. In 1909, with the publication of *Les rites de passage,* Arnold van Gennep applied the label *dynamistic* to the theories of the origin of religion put forth by Marett (1900) and by J. N. B. Hewitt (1902), based upon the experience of the sacred as power. But van Gennep drew a sharp line between what he called dynamism, or the conceptual framework that assumed impersonal sacred power, and animism, which assumed that sacred power was personal. Since his goal was to classify rituals, and to a large extent to understand by means of classification, he did not enter into the theoretical debate concerning the origins of religion. Yet, because of the obvious value of his way of discussing ritual activities, his work did influence the theoretical debate, if only by showing that it was possible to make significant contributions to the study of religion without choosing a position concerning the question of origins.

No less implicit in van Gennep's work was the assumption of the centrality of the idea of power in religion, not so much in its own theorizing or attempts at self-understanding, but in its actual behavior. Thus he coined the term *magico-religious* to emphasize the practical side of human interaction with sacred power. All ritual activity he labeled as magical because it was in the realm of technique; that is, it sought to implement a practical goal, namely, to influence or even to manipulate the sacred power for useful purposes. It was, therefore, the efficacy of the sacred, its potentiality to effect change or to prevent change—in short, its power—that van Gennep emphasized in his basic insight that ritual, or, at any rate, many rituals, seek to effect transitions from one state or situation to another.

At about the same time that Marett and van Gennep were formulating their views of religion, other theories about the nature and, to some extent, the origin of religion were being formulated outside the conceptual circle of the new discipline of anthropology. Influenced by anthropological and ethnological studies, but operating in a very different intellectual framework, was Rudolf Otto, a theologian who took as his spiritual mentor Friedrich Schleiermacher. In *Das Heilige* (1917), Otto presented what might be called a phenomenological psychology of religion, in that he sought to describe the structure of human reaction to what is experienced as "the holy." Otto's work as a religious theorist, because of his attitude toward human nature and in his introspective approach to religion, may be considered a late flowering of the Romantic movement. He exhibits a qualified anti-intellectualist stance toward religious psychology: religion is an ineradicable part of human nature, present from the beginning, but, while religion itself admits of historical development, the psychological makeup of human beings, which makes religion possible, does not. Therefore, any religious experience, however far removed in time and space, can be understood by the modern student, because it shares a fundamental unity with all religion. Further, Otto appeals in a famous passage to the reader's own experience, rather than to his rational faculties, as the guarantor of the accuracy and usefulness of his descriptions:

> The reader is invited to direct his mind to a moment of deeply-felt religious experience, as little as possible qualified by other forms of consciousness. Whoever cannot do this, whoever knows no such moments in his experience, is requested to read no farther; for it is not easy to discuss questions of religious psychology with one who can recollect the emotions of his adolescence, the discomforts of indigestion, or, say, social feelings, but cannot recall any intrinsically religious feelings. (Otto, [1917] 1923, p. 8)

The fundamental religious experience Otto termed as the feeling of the presence of "the numinous." In this, his theory closely approximates that of Marett's "occult power" (or mysterious power or the sacred). But Otto sought in a systematic way to show that this feeling existed psychologically prior to any conceptualization of a god or spirit or soul and, at the same time, was the religious *sine qua non* behind these concepts. As he put it, the "ideogram" of the numinous must be present in the "concept" of god, since the former is the nonrational, feeling component of the rational concept. The mental process by which ideograms become concepts he called "schematization."

Implicit in his argument is a tension between experience or feeling, on the one hand, and *a priori* ideas, on the other, since he wished to affirm both the priority of religious experience and the truth of certain religious concepts. Indeed, it is his strong allegiance to a belief in the superiority of Christian theological formulations that has been largely responsible for Otto's lack of influence in anthropology and in related disciplines concerned with the study of religion. Added to this was his insistence upon the *sui generis* character of religious experience, which tended to isolate religion from other psychological realms, such as the experience of beauty, sexual pleasure, or terror.

The heart of Otto's system is his description of the feelings that, to a greater or lesser extent and in varying mixtures, all religious experiences evoke. These are *mysterium tremendum* and *mysterium fascinans*. The ambivalence in the human response to the object of religion we have already encountered in the dichotomy of *mana* and taboo, the positive and negative aspects of sacred power. In Otto's schema, van Gennep's work focused primarily upon the *fascinans* aspect, since the efficacy of sacred power is necessary for ritual goals to be realized, although of course van Gennep also discussed rituals of avoidance. It is particularly in the analysis of the negative side of the dichotomy that Otto's unique contribution to the understanding of religious experience can be seen. Choosing as his illustrative data primarily the canonical literature of Christianity, but supplementing it with references to such famous Christian virtuosi as Martin Luther as well as to Islamic and Hindu mystics, he documents minutely the daunting presence of the numinous in the more complex or "higher" religions. For purposes of exposition, he divides his first category into two. The first is *mysterium*, which he explains as having its closest analogy in the feeling of uncanniness that irrationally can seize us when, for example, we are listening to ghost stories or passing graveyards. This feeling emphasizes the radical otherness *(das ganz Andere)* of the numinous and results in a uniquely religious dread. If, according to Otto, this feeling is allowed to predominate in the religious experience, aberrations such as demon worship can result. To this is inextricably joined the element of *tremendum*, the overpoweringness of the numinous, whose ideogram in Christianity is God's wrath. Moving from experience *(der Moment)* to ideogram to developed theological concept, *tremendum* becomes divine omnipotence.

Tremendum, therefore, is the place in Otto's schema where the experience of sacred power has its proper location. He further elaborates its effects by the ideogram of "creature consciousness," the elementary feeling articulated by the thought of having been created, assembled, as it were, as a kind of contingent and therefore somewhat arbitrary and temporary configuration with no intrinsic merit or value or power. To sense this is to feel that one is nothing over against the infinite power and presence of the Other. Out of it come the relatively sophisticated ideas of creation and of sin. Notice that sin is now partly derived not only from the memory of having contravened a law or broken a taboo; it is also intrinsic to the religious encounter itself, particularly from the encounter with power in its overwhelming immensity. Of course we refer here to the joining or schematization of *tremendum* and the doctrine of sin, especially of original sin, which Otto argues finally makes the Christian concept of sin credible and intellectually satisfying.

It could be argued that the element of *fascinans*, or attraction, in the numinous experience also implies a tacit recognition of kratophany, but in Otto's own handling of it, *fascinans* is expressed in such terms as love, duty, and the motivation to pursue the religious life. It is an elementary recognition or experience of value rather than a perception of utility or status, which seem to predominate in the idea of *mana*.

Mircea Eliade and the History of Religions. Mircea Eliade linked his own work in the phenomenology of religion with that of Otto when in *The Sacred and the Profane* (1957) he expressed admiration for Otto's descriptions of religious experience. Yet he sought to establish, at the same time, a different perspective, one that took as its starting point the categories of the sacred/profane dichotomy first given prominence by the French sociologist Émile Durkheim. Eliade was concerned with what might be called collective psychology, rather than a psychology of individual, particular experiences. His work has sought to catalog and explain (as in *Patterns in Comparative Religion*, 1958) the great collective representations, that is, symbols, by which religious meaning is mediated in a variety of cultural contexts. In accepting Otto's description of the "irrational" aspect of encounters with the sacred, Eliade infuses his

use of the term *sacred* with specific meaning that includes power as a central element. Thus the encounter with sacred power is seen in the structure of the symbols of the sacred, while power is one of the necessary attributes of the sacred.

Eliade is perhaps most like Otto when he discusses archaic techniques of ecstasy, as he does at length in his *Shamanism* (1951). Here he shows that the shaman often unwillingly encounters, and is possessed by, sacred power in an unequal test of strength that leaves the human personality transformed. The result is the ability ritually to achieve *ecstasis*, or a projection of self out of self, in order to tap the power of sacred realities as a religious specialist serving the community. But the interpretation of shamanism is not restricted to psychological aspects: the symbols, for example, of drum and "flying costume," by which shamanic rituals are accomplished, are also presented, as well as myths that both buttress and explain the worldview of shamanism.

Throughout his works dealing with archaic religion, Eliade has emphasized the creative power of myth and of the sacred beings whose stories myths are (see *Myth and Reality*, 1963). Of course, this power is understood by those for whom myths still live as the power of the sacred itself, made knowable and thus usable through myth. For Eliade, cosmogonic myth is perforce the most important type, since it taps into the ubiquitous psychological tendency that he has termed the assumption of the "prestige of origins." Here, knowledge of the origin of a thing is equivalent to having power over that thing. Thus knowledge of the origin of the world as contained in the cosmogonic myth gives human beings power over their entire environment. Rituals that celebrate this knowledge by reiterating the myth, or, more dramatically, by reenacting it, are at least very useful to the scholar in attempting to grasp the meaning of a religious worldview. Eliade has also noted that the prestige of origins and the supposed power of origins continue to function psychologically, often unconsciously, in modern secular contexts.

The sacred has power, in Eliade's view, both to make the world meaningful by providing a religious worldview and to provide a means of escape from a desacralized and therefore meaningless world (*Cosmos and History*, 1949). His work on yoga (*Yoga: Immortality and Freedom*, 1954) details this latter function of sacred power in Hinduism and Buddhism. In *samādhi*, the yogin achieves the final stage in the personal journey by which the true self realizes its identity with the sacred. This state brings with it not only the bliss of a superconsciousness but also a number of sacred powers: knowledge and sensitivity beyond the ordinary as well as psychophysical powers (*siddhis*) that mark the accomplished practitioner of yoga.

In his discussion of yoga, Eliade also touches upon an especially revealing concept of Hinduism, namely, *tapas*. This idea, which is very old in the Indian subcontinent, can be rendered as "the power of asceticism," or "the sacred power by which the world was created." Sometimes, indeed, in later popular folk tales and myths, *tapas* becomes the power of desire and of sexual potency, which both creates all beings and threatens all with dissolution. Yoga as an ascetic discipline is thought to tap the power of *tapas*, for it is sometimes understood that *tapas* is the power by which the extraordinary accomplishment of final liberation is won. Among the devotional cults of modern Hinduism, the Śaivas honor Śiva, the phallic creator god who is also the prototype of all yogins.

Belief in the power of sacred models to raise individuals to new states of being (see *Rites and Symbols of Initiation*, 1958), especially as this power is brought to bear in rituals, is documented in Eliade's work on "initiation scenarios," which are so widespread even in secular literature and fantasy. These survivals of living symbol systems continue to haunt modern people's dreams and imaginative creations. In archaic societies, these symbols of death and rebirth—of being swallowed by a monster, for example—are especially significant ways by which the power of the sacred can bring about the transition from childhood to adulthood, from ordinary living human being to powerful ancestor, from ordinary human to powerful shaman. In salvation religions, these same techniques and symbols are employed in the crucial transition from a state of damnation to that of salvation and beatitude.

The amazing ability of symbols to endure through the ages and despite profound cultural changes, as Eliade has documented in the historical portions of his work, testifies to the power that symbols wield in human life. These powerful symbols appear to possess almost a life of their own, inasmuch as they are constitutive of the human personality. To possess sacred power is at the same time to be possessed by it, a view that Rudolf Otto would heartily support and one that the psychologist C. G. Jung emphasized with his theory of archetypes. [*See* Archetypes.]

Phenomenologically, it is impossible to determine the source of symbols either within or without the self that experiences them. Indeed, Jung regarded religion as a traditional response to especially powerful symbols that arose from the hidden energy- and meaning-centers of the psyche, that is, the archetypes. What a symbol in a dream of myth masked or partially revealed of an ar-

chetype could be determined from the human reaction to it. Archetypal symbols engender great fear, awe, and longing: they are the mainsprings of our deepest and strongest emotions, and are experienced as numinous centers of power:

> When an archetype appears in a dream, in a fantasy, or in life, it always brings with it a certain influence or power by virtue of which it either exercises a numinous or fascinating effect, or impels to action. . . . Owing to their specific energy—for they behave like highly charged autonomous centres of power—they exert a fascinating and possessive influence upon the conscious mind and can thus produce extensive alterations in the subject. (Jung, 1953, p. 80)

The very process of maturation, both culturally and individually, which Jung believed to be the main focus of religious behavior, is a process of the ever deepening experience of archetypal images and of the progressive transformation of archetypally generated symbols.

Thus, in Jung's thought the ideas of power and of religious experience were strongly associated. Religion was one way of dealing with these internal structures although by no means the only way. On the other hand, religious behavior was derived from these structures as the driving force of both thought and action.

Van der Leeuw and the Phenomenology of Religion. One major work on the nature of religion requires special mention, because it uses the idea of power as its central organizing principle. This is Gerardus van der Leeuw's *Phänomenologie der Religion* (1933), translated into English as *Religion in Essence and Manifestation* (1938). Van der Leeuw begins his ambitious work with a discussion of the experience of power as the founding impetus of religion:

> The religious man perceives that with which his religion deals as primal, as originative or causal; and only to reflective thought does this become the Object of the experience that is contemplated. . . . Theory, and even the slightest degree of generalization, are still far remote; man remains quite content with the purely practical recognition that this Object is a departure from all that is usual and familiar; and this again is the consequence of the *Power* it generates. (van der Leeuw, 1938, p. 23)

He thus describes a pretheoretical mode of perception in which the experience of power and otherness are combined, and in which the notion of efficacy dominates. This power originates and causes events; it is thus fundamentally creative.

Van der Leeuw quickly finds the traditional language of scholarship to be misleading, since it improperly distinguishes religion and magic at this elemental level:

> It is precisely a characteristic of the earliest thinking that it does not exactly distinguish the magical, and all that borders on the supernatural, from the powerful; to the primitive mind, in fact, all marked "efficiency" is *per se* magical, and "sorcery" *eo ipso* mighty. . . . Magic is certainly manifested by power; to employ power, however, is not in itself to act magically, although every extraordinary action of primitive man possesses a tinge of the magical. (ibid., pp. 24–25)

Although he often calls this elemental level of religiosity "primitive," he rejects the hypothesis that it exists as a stage in religious evolution. For him, the term designates a level of thought and experience that is found, to a degree, in all religions at all times. Further, van der Leeuw considers the notion of an ordering power, or sacred order, as in the Sanskrit *ṛta* or the Chinese *tao*, to be theories about power as advanced as the notion of an individual soul as a personal center of power.

Van der Leeuw interprets taboo as perhaps the most elemental reaction to the experience of sacred power: one is characteristically fearful in the face of the disparity of power, and taboo is an attempt to mount some defense against it. Indeed, he derives the Roman *religio* from an experience of dread. Thus religion for the Romans was a system of taboos set up in response to the awesome appearance of sacred power. "Observance," he writes, "is just benumbed awe which, at any moment, can be revived" (ibid., p. 50).

The entire first part of *Religion in Essence and Manifestation* is a long essay demonstrating that the notion of power is the key to understanding a wide variety of religious phenomena. For example, celestial symbols are an important part of many religions because they manifest cosmic power in such a way that humans can model their behavior upon the orderly motions of heavenly bodies, thus tapping their great power. Again, animal cults and totemism van der Leeuw explains as an attempt by humans to obtain for themselves the powers that animals control by virtue of their superior strength and skills, such as the ability to fly. The totem animal is especially significant in this regard because it "is a sort of reservoir for the potency of the tribe or clan" (ibid., p. 79). Angels represent a projection or emanation (they are "messengers") of specific powers of gods; sacred kingship is a recognition that the power of the most powerful man is, in part, sacred power, while belief in salvation implies faith in an extraordinary power of transformation.

Part 2 of this work takes up the reaction to sacred power as apprehended within: that is, the effect of the experience of power on human lives. Here religious functionaries, such as priest or shaman, are discussed, as well as the transformed life of the saint. Finally, re-

ligious organization, the social reaction to power, is sketched out.

Further description of van der Leeuw's work must founder because of his own interpretation of the phenomenological task: he eschewed any conscious hermeneutic or theory of religion as false to the data. Thus his work cannot be neatly summed up by reference to a relatively simple theoretical model. But in much of his work, the basic experience of power functions as much as a heuristic device as a basic insight into the nature of religion.

Another scholar who has influenced the notion of religious power held by students of religion in recent years is Georges Dumézil, who sought to develop some structural tools for dealing not with all religions but with that large class of religions known to have been derived from Indo-European cultures. His fundamental thesis is that the gods of Indo-European peoples reflect, and in turn are reflected in, the social structure of a given culture. This structure, in three main divisions, can be described in terms of the functions, or typical activities, performed by the gods or social classes in question. Although this thesis has far-reaching implications, most important for present purposes is the fact that in many cultures, most clearly in ancient India in the Vedic literature, these functions, in turn, seem to be based upon different concepts of power. Thus, because the concerns of the third-function gods are fecundity and productivity in the terrestrial sphere, they possess a special power or energy that controls and thus either promotes or inhibits the growth of herds or the abundance of harvests. This power was often thought of as sexual in nature.

But it is in the second and first functions, as Dumézil defined them, that differences in the basic nature of power become most apparent. Here he distinguishes sharply between the mysterious, hidden, even magical, power of the first-function gods and the merely physical power wielded by the gods of the second function. The second function belongs to the warrior, in India especially to Indra, who slew the cosmic demon Vṛtra, and who was the protector of the Aryan tribes and the leader of the human warriors. Indeed, so important did this physical power become that there is evidence in the *Ṛgveda* that Indra to some extent replaced Varuṇa, the primary first-function god. Varuṇa and Mitra together are the representative of the function of sovereignty, whose position at the apex of the hierarchy of gods and humans was, originally at least, assured by the power they wielded. The first function Dumézil characterizes in general as celestial, priestly, and concerned with the exercise of magical and juridical sovereignty. Varuṇa especially is "a great sorcerer, disposed more than any other on the level of sovereignty to *māyā*, magic which creates forms either temporary or permanent, disposed also to the knots in which he binds the guilty, a capture both immediate and irresistible" (Dumézil, 1968–1973, vol. 1, p. 148).

Coupled both to the characteristic celestial symbolism and to the idea of mysterious power is the association of Varuṇa and Mitra with the cosmic order, *ṛta*. Increasingly subservient to this impersonal order, the first-function gods nonetheless reflect and to a degree wield the very power by which the cosmos moves. This dynamism was especially impressive because the means of its motion was unseen: just as the stars or the sun followed their preordained courses; just as the seasons followed their patterns and other events such as disease occurred as punishments whose agents or mechanism, so to speak, could not be discovered by means of the ordinary senses; just so did the sovereign gods control the very power by which the world was ordered and by which its order was maintained. Physical power, the power of Indra and of war, could be understood, if not always defended against. Even the enormous physical power of a god was still physical and palpable, and therefore of a fundamentally different nature than was *māyā*, the unseen and all the more frightening power of Varuṇa.

In the human realm, according to Dumézil's thesis, the social structure also reflected these different types of power. Of course it is the brahman caste, the hereditary priests, who wield Varuṇa's power, to some degree, because of their knowledge of the rites of sacrifice. In the cult, the priests function as mediators of sovereign sacred power: the words and actions of the rituals place in the priestly hands this same mysterious power, which is the power to influence cosmic forces for the benefit of humans.

Although Dumézil's point of departure is the Vedic texts of India, he applies this schema also to later Indian epics as well as to Persian, Greek, and other European religious literature. Beyond this, other scholars have sought to extend the three function theory to non-Indo-European cultures as well. Most notable of these, perhaps, is Atsuhiko Yoshida, whose "La mythologie japonaise: Essai d'interpretation structurale" (1961–1963) is the most thorough attempt to apply these categories not so much in order to show Indo-European influences upon Japanese mythology but as a useful interpretive tool.

Power, Magic, and Charisma. The use of the term *magic* has had a checkered career, both within Christian theological circles and within the realm of comparative religion or history of religions *(Religionswissenschaft)*. On the one hand, it has shared the pejorative connota-

tions of such terms as *superstition* and *idolatry* in its emic or confessional evaluation; on the other hand, as evidenced by such compounds as *magico-religious*, from the etic viewpoint the term has been used in a purely descriptive way, as, for example, in the work of Arnold van Gennep, noted above. From this latter perspective, magic denotes simply sacred power experienced as impersonal and, to a degree, manipulatable: it is power in its most useful mode, since it can be turned to one's advantage with what we might call a minimum of harmful side effects. Providing only that the formulae and rituals are properly followed, results are predictable, even automatic. For many theologically inclined thinkers, this notion, and even more the attitude toward the sacred that it implies, must necessarily be a "lower" form of religion, or degenerate religion—or perhaps not religion at all. This is because it is felt to be incompatible with the proper sense of reverence and dependence due to a personal god as in Christianity or Judaism. From this perspective, to treat God as an object of magic is to blaspheme since this tends to reduce the majesty and freedom of the deity.

The lack of consensus among scholars as to the proper definition and use of the term *magic* reflects not so much differences in perception as differences in the purposes to which the data are put. From the purely descriptive point of view, a distinction between magic and religion, or between magical religion and pure religion, has proved practically impossible to make. But from the normative, theological point of view, the term *magic* has proved too useful a term to be easily given up, since it delineates what is felt to be a theologically unacceptable attitude toward the power of God. Thus, even when a pejorative sense is not intended in descriptive works, it is often improperly assumed by many readers.

Examples of the difficulties that lie in wait for those who would distinguish between a manipulative approach to the sacred and a properly humble and propitiatory approach are easily produced. Subtle psychological distinctions must be made, since the existential concern of all religious people for their own welfare makes a totally unself-serving approach to sacred power improbable, if not impossible, for ordinary human beings. Put another way, we may ask how often Christians pray for forgiveness of sins out of nothing more than a pure and unselfish love of their god? Or again, rites of passage, which are ubiquitous, seek always a more or less definite personal or communal gain—but who can assess with complete certainty the motivation of the participants? Discounting "manipulativeness" can lead to a restriction of the term *religion* to such an extent that it is lost as a useful descriptive term.

Another conceptual tool relating to religious power is *charisma*, a term made popular by the sociologist of religion Max Weber (in *Religionssoziologie*, 1922), who defined it as the authority by which individuals were accorded status and power over others or, related to that, by which the functions or offices themselves—regardless of the officeholder—were felt to be worthy of respect. Indeed, Weber expressly linked charisma both to *mana* and to the Iranian *maga* (Skt., *māyā*), from which our word *magic* is derived. Looked at closely, it may be seen that the notion of charisma, at least from the limited horizon of sociology, is rather mysterious. That is to say, the reason or means whereby one person is accorded this respect, or is seen as having a special inner power of attraction, is not explained or well understood. Certainly such things as character, unusual skills, great stature or strength, or force of mien or manner all seem to contribute, but, finally, *charisma* remains a relational term that classifies the reaction of others to the person whom scholars then label as charismatic.

The Chinese religious tradition offers a concrete example of belief in charisma, and even of theorizing about it within two ancient systems of thought, namely, Confucianism and Taoism. These two religions, although often antagonistic, nonetheless share a common origin and a number of common ideas. Two are especially relevant here: *tao*, or cosmic order, and *te*, variously translated as "virtue," "character," "power," or "charisma." It is possible to view these two concepts not only as closely associated in Chinese thought but as two aspects of a single reality: sacred power. *Tao* is in many ways similar to the Sanskrit *ṛta*, in that it is not only order but also the power that drives a dynamic universe. All things ultimately derive from *tao* (Lao-tzu appropriately calls it "the mother of all things"), and all things move and change according to its "laws." To be sure, it is not entirely knowable, although Confucianism is more optimistic on this point, with its emphasis on study of the way of the ancients and its belief that *tao* is perfectly embodied in *li* (ritual or decorum).

When *tao* is perfectly embodied in a person, then he is called a sage. Such a one is as perfect an exemplar of the universal *tao* as a human being can be. To be a sage is to be perfectly in harmony with *tao*. But taken from the point of view of the individual, such a one has great *te* or personal power. This power, like *tao*, although it may be embodied in a person, is not in itself personal: it is without consciousness, or will, or emotion; it has no purpose. The intrinsic power of a sage is expressed, both in Confucianism and in Taoism, in the image of the sage-king Shun, who "acted without action"—yet all things were accomplished, and the empire was at peace.

Shun is also likened to the pole star, which merely sits facing south, while all things revolve around it in a kind of cosmic ballet.

This *te* or charisma is brought down to earth, as it were, in the Confucian ideal of the *chün-tzu*, the "superior man" or "true gentleman," who also brings about by example, by ritual, and by the power of his presence the longed-for proper ordering of human society. It is not, of course, that he does nothing; rather, he is so well attuned to *tao* (or to "heaven," *t'ien*) that whatever he chooses to do will be the correct thing in the circumstances. When such a person is a ruler, or, one might say after Weber, when charisma of person is combined with charisma of office, one has an especially powerful force for harmony. Interestingly, however, even here, at least in the more mystical Taoist writings, a sage does not will the right, does not arrive by careful thought or logical deduction at the right course of action; rather, because he is a sage, such action will spontaneously occur, sometimes with the sage as direct agent, but sometimes at the hands of others mysteriously influenced by him.

This mysteriously acting power, action at a distance and without conscious will, sounds in many ways like the Vedic *māyā*. It is sacred power, at work in the human world, that reflects and ultimately is one with the sacred power that underlies all activity in the world of nature.

Is such a belief crude magic, or perhaps mere superstition? Some would answer in the affirmative. Certainly it insists upon the impersonal nature of the sacred and of the workings of sacred power. And the will to manipulate this power to benefit self, or the society as a whole, is strong, especially in Confucianism. Yet there is also awe and reverence for the power: it is difficult to gain, and it has its own ways. Others would claim that this example shows the impossibility of separating magic and religion, that they are inextricably merged into the idea of sacred power and into the active responses of human beings as they have perceived that power over the millennia of religious history.

[*See also* Sacred and the Profane, The; Magic; *and the biographies of the principal scholars mentioned herein.*]

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Codrington, R. H. *The Melanesians: Studies in Their Anthropology and Folklore* (1891). New Haven, 1957.

Dumézil, Georges. *L'ideologie tripartie des Indo-Européens.* Brussels, 1958.

Dumézil, Georges. *Mythe et epopée.* 3 vols. Paris, 1968–1973.

Eliade, Mircea. *Cosmos and History: The Myth of the Eternal Return* (1949). New York, 1959.

Eliade, Mircea. *Shamanism: Archaic Techniques of Ecstasy* (1951). Rev. & enl. ed. New York, 1964.

Eliade, Mircea. *Yoga: Immortality and Freedom* (1954). 2d ed., rev. & enl. Princeton, 1969.

Eliade, Mircea. *The Sacred and the Profane* (1957). New York, 1959.

Eliade, Mircea. *Patterns in Comparative Religion.* New York, 1958.

Eliade, Mircea. *Rites and Symbols of Initiation: The Mysteries of Birth and Rebirth* (1958). New York, 1975.

Gennep, Arnold van. *The Rites of Passage* (1909). Chicago, 1960.

Hewitt, J. N. B. "Orenda and a Definition of Religion." *American Anthropologist* 4 (1902): 33–46.

Jensen, Adolf E. *Myth and Cult among Primitive Peoples* (1951). Chicago, 1963.

Jung, C. G. "The Psychology of the Unconscious" (1943). In *The Collected Works of C. G. Jung,* vol. 7. Princeton, 1953.

Leeuw, Gerardus van der. *Phänomenologie der Religion.* Tübingen, 1933. Translated by J. E. Turner as *Religion in Essence and Manifestation,* 2 vols. (1938; reprint, Gloucester, Mass., 1967).

Marett, R. R. "Pre-animistic Religion." *Folklore* 11 (1900): 162–182.

Marett, R. R. *The Threshold of Religion.* London, 1909.

Otto, Rudolf. *Das Heilige.* Breslau, 1917. Translated by John W. Harvey as *The Idea of the Holy* (1923; 2d ed., London, 1960).

Tylor, E. B. *Primitive Culture* (1871). 2 vols. New York, 1970.

Vries, Jan de. *The Study of Religion.* New York, 1967.

Wach, Joachim. *Sociology of Religion* (1944). Chicago, 1962.

Weber, Max. *Religionssoziologie.* Tübingen, 1922. Translated by Ephraim Fischoff as *The Sociology of Religion* (Boston, 1963).

Yoshida, Atsuhiko. "La mythologie japonaise: Essai d'interpretation structural." *Revue de l'histoire des religions* 160 (1961): 47–66; 161 (1962): 25–44; and 163 (1963): 225–248.

Yoshido, Atsuhiko. "Nihon shinwa to In-o shinwa." In *Nihon shinwa no hikaku kenkyu,* edited by Obayashi Taryo. Tokyo, 1974.

ALAN L. MILLER

PRAJĀPATI belongs to the powerful ritual center of Vedic traditions and their discourses known as the Brāhmaṇas, where he is the supreme being and father of the gods. He is the link between the ancient Puruṣa mythology that instituted sacrifice, on the one hand, and the late Vedic bifurcation into a metaphysics of the impersonal Absolute *(brahman)* and the personal god Brahmā, on the other. In the religious history of South Asia, cosmogony, sacrifice, the soma cult, asceticism and self-mortification, the concept of salvation, the ritualization of procreation, and the advisory role of the grandfather of the gods are all dependent to a significant degree on the various guises of Prajāpati.

As lord *(pati)* of creatures *(prajā),* Prajāpati is best known in the tenth book of the *Ṛgveda* through specu-